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5 SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
6 JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE U.S. CAPITOL,
7 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
8 WASHINGTON, D.C.

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12 CONTINUED INTERVIEW OF: FRANCES HAUGEN

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16 Friday, December 17, 2021

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18 Washington, D.C.

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21 The interview in the above matter was held in room 1540A, Longworth House
22 Office Building, commencing at 2:02 p.m.

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2 Appearances:

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6 For the SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE

7 THE JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE U.S. CAPITOL:

8

9 [REDACTED] SENIOR COUNSEL

10 [REDACTED] PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER

11 [REDACTED] COUNSEL

12 [REDACTED] CHIEF CLERK

13

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16 For FRANCES HAUGEN:

17

18 ANDREW PETER BAKAJ, COUNSEL

19 LIBBY LIU, CEO, WHISTLEBLOWER AID

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2 [REDACTED] Good afternoon. This is a continuation of the transcribed
3 interview of Frances Haugen, begun on November 22nd, 2021, and conducted by the
4 House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
5 Capitol, pursuant to House Resolution 503.

6 Ms. Haugen, welcome back.

7 Ms. Haugen. [Inaudible.]

8 [REDACTED] This will be another --

9 Ms. Haugen. Sorry.

10 [REDACTED] It's fine. This will be another staff-led interview. As with last
11 time, members of the select committee may join later and, of course, may choose also to
12 ask questions.

13 My name is [REDACTED] and I'm an investigative counsel with the select
14 committee. With me today are [REDACTED], senior counsel and senior adviser; and
15 [REDACTED] professional staff member; and [REDACTED] chief clerk.

16 As with last time, I will be asking questions for the staff. You and your attorney
17 will have an opportunity to review the transcript. Members can join in at any time, to
18 take the lead, ask followup, or ask for clarifications.

19 You are permitted to have an attorney present.

20 At this time, could counsel please state their name for the record, and, Libby,
21 could you also please state your name and affiliation.

22 Mr. Bakaj. Hello, this is Andrew Bakaj, and I'm counsel for Ms. Haugen.

23 Ms. Liu. This is Libby Liu, L-i-u. I'm the CEO of Whistleblower Aid.

24 [REDACTED] So, Frances, just to make things move smoothly, I'm going to
25 run through some things that we talked about last time. Please wait until each question

1 is completed before you begin your response, and we will try to wait until your response
2 is complete before we ask our next question.

3 The stenographer cannot record nonverbal responses, so -- such as shaking your
4 head, so it's important that you answer each question with an audible verbal response.

5 If you need me to repeat a question, let me know. If you need to talk to your
6 lawyers, please just say so. If you need a quick break, let us know.

7 And if the reporters have any clarifying questions, they may interrupt us to make
8 sure they can capture our statements accurately.

9 We ask that you provide complete answers based on your best recollection. If a
10 question is not clear, please ask for clarification.

11 I also want to let you know, remind you, that it's unlawful to deliberately provide
12 false information to Congress, even though we're not proceeding under oath today.

13 So the plan for today is, we have 2 hours, we'll try to get through as much as we
14 can. There may be some cleanup from last time, but we're going to try to turn to some
15 new documents. Do you have any questions about that?

16 Ms. Haugen. No. We're good.

17

BY 

18 Q All right. So could we pull up document 19, and I'm going to mark that as
19 exhibit F, continuing from last time. This is also known as -- this is called Carol's Journey
20 to QAnon, Frances, if you --

21 A Uh-huh, uh-huh, yep.

22 Q Okay. So did you provide this document to the committee?

23 A Yes.

24 Q And are you familiar with this document?

25 A Yes.

1 Q So what is your takeaway from the test user account study?

2 A So this -- this specific study is one of a series of studies, three of which were
3 done by the same data scientists. One was done by another group inside Facebook
4 called Strategic Response, that all found the same pattern repeated, which was that you
5 can begin from relatively centrist interests, you know, center left, center right, and if you
6 take an account that has no friends, no other interests, and you just click on whatever
7 Facebook gives you -- so you click on the content, you follow the groups, you join the
8 groups they suggest, that kind of thing -- you end up very rapidly being pushed towards
9 extremist content.

10 And that's because the system is designed to try to maximize engagement in the
11 system, and engagement is defined as, like, likes, comments, reshares, forwarding
12 something, like a message to someone else, that kind of thing.

13 And Facebook's internal research has shown repeatedly, and external research,
14 that it is easier to provoke people to anger than it is to other emotions, and as a result,
15 you end up having a selective pressure where more and more extreme content is
16 recommended by the system.

17 Q And can you just talk briefly about groups you may like and pages you may
18 like and how that -- how a user might interact with them?

19 A Sure. So Facebook, in order to -- let's imagine a version of Facebook that
20 didn't have groups and pages. So the content you would see then would be largely -- it
21 would be from your family, friends, people you actually know, but Facebook would not be
22 able to generate as long of sessions; like, people wouldn't look at as much content or as
23 many ads, and Facebook would make less money.

24 So Facebook has to figure out how to get you to express interest in pages -- so
25 that's pages you might know -- and groups. And right now, the heuristics for deciding

1 what is a high-quality group are very similar to how content is selected. So groups that
2 have lots and lots of engagement are considered higher quality groups.

3 The only problem with the strategy is, going back as far as at least 2016, there
4 have been reports that things like -- I think it was the 2016 disclosure said that it was like
5 65 percent of people who joined neo-Nazi groups in Germany joined because Facebook
6 recommended those groups to them.

7 So groups that have more extreme content also, as a general rule, have more
8 engagement for similar reasons to what I already talked about, and as a result, there is a
9 bias in terms of which groups Facebook will promote to people that come from groups
10 you should join.

11 Q Great. Let's circle back a minute. Do you know if there's a follow-up
12 study or a different study that might show a similar result about extremist groups in the
13 United States similar to that neo-Nazi study in Germany?

14 A Ooh. I know there's a variety of documents that are about how groups'
15 recommendations are dangerous, like, they're -- I know we have docs that talk about the
16 idea that, like, Facebook has a lag between when a group is created and when it can
17 actually assess whether or not that group is a safe group or not. And that Facebook
18 knew that that was a major security liability, because it allowed, up until, I think pretty
19 close to the election, if your group got taken down for being a violent group, you could
20 just go create a new group with the same name and the same admins, and that would be
21 considered a new group. And you have to go and reaccumulate bad behavior points to
22 get taken down.

23 There are other documents that show things, like, because there are bad rate
24 limits set, so this is, I believe, other documents that you have in the list of enclosures, you
25 talk -- they talk about how because people could invite so many individuals per day, and

1 there wasn't good takedown rules for, like, someone might have multiple accounts and
2 invite, you know, 2,000 people a day from each of those multiple accounts, very rapidly,
3 you can have thousands and thousands of people invited to a group.

4 A really important thing for people to be aware of is that you can receive content
5 from a group for 30 days after you're invited without having actually accepted the
6 invitation. And if you engage in any of that content, it's considered a follow.

7 So allowing people to mass invite people is dangerous because it creates an
8 avenue where, let's say, they clickbait you into reacting to something or commenting on
9 something, now they have successfully gained an avenue to inject content into your news
10 feed going forward.

11 Q Okay. Let's take -- I have a couple followups. Let's take these reverse
12 chronological order from when they came up.

13 So the fact that if I send someone an invite, they can receive content from that
14 group on their news feed, and if they engage, it's a follow, do you know if that continued
15 through the election and through the January 6th period?

16 A I believe so. We can look through the docs and try to see if it specifically
17 discusses that. I am not sure, though.

18 Q Okay. Thank you. And you did mention that you think up until close to
19 the election, there was a lag between --

20 A There was -- I know there was --

21 Q -- the groups?

22 A So I know that I have a doc from August 2020 that talks about that
23 phenomena. I am not sure how -- and I know -- I was in the review meeting where
24 taking very aggressive action with regard to that was, like, it was decided it wasn't going
25 to be feasible because it would slightly slow down the growth of groups by

1 like -- apparently groups in their first few days are, like, very -- like, you want to
2 encourage group creators, and the best way to encourage them is by having lots of
3 people join the group.

4 And -- but the -- I'm not entirely sure what was done after that. I think there is a
5 chance that they may have done something, but I -- I only know that secondhand, like, I
6 talked to a reporter about it, and he said that something had happened, but I'm not sure
7 exactly what.

8 Q Okay. And you mentioned three other studies?

9 A Uh-huh.

10 Q I'm sorry. This was a part of a trilogy.

11 A Yes.

12 Q Is one of them -- what are the other two?

13 A So the other two -- so the very first one was out of India. So it's one about
14 a person who's expressing interest in kind of BJP topics to demonstrate that it pushes you
15 towards, like, ethnic, violence-related content -- oh, sorry, yeah.

16 Q What was the acronym?

17 A BJP.

18 Q And that is?

19 A It's the -- I don't know what the acronym, how it -- it's the Hindu Nationalist
20 Party in India.

21 Q Okay.

22 A I don't know what the acronym extrapolates out to.

23 The -- the second one -- I believe Carol's Journey to QAnon might have been the
24 second one, but it might have been the third. The other one is -- I think it's like Karen --

25 Q I think we have that document.

1 A -- Descent Down the Rabbit Hole, something like that, and it basically is
2 someone who expresses center left interests and how long does it take them to be shown
3 radical content.

4 The last one, which was not done by the same person but is the exact same
5 methodology, was done as a proactive risk response -- like a proactive incident response
6 with regard to rumors that people were being shown anorexia-related content after
7 expressing interest in like innocuous topics like healthy eating.

8 And so, like, it is a -- it is a commonly, like, I think it shows a pattern of behavior in
9 terms of knowing that this is a technique that can be used to understand the impacts of
10 the algorithms.

11 Q And you mentioned a review meeting you were in --

12 A Uh-huh.

13 Q -- talking about the groups and the lag.

14 A Uh-huh.

15 Q Can you talk a little bit more about review meetings?

16 A Sure. So there was a meeting called the Civic Integrity Launch Review, and
17 the name is a little bit of a misnomer because it also did like project reviews. So, like, if
18 you were part way through a project, you might go in there.

19 That finding was reviewed at one of these launch review meetings. They
20 happened -- I think that we had 2 hours' worth of them on Thursdays, once a week. And
21 that was -- that was where I saw that, where I came in contact with that document.

22 [REDACTED] All right. It appears someone is waiting in the lobby.

23 [REDACTED], could you look into that?

24 [REDACTED] We think that someone's just trying to reconnect. So if there is
25 someone waiting, if we can check and see if that's Libby, that would be great.

1 [REDACTED] Thank you.

2 BY [REDACTED]

3 Q So let's dig into Carol's Journey into QAnon. So what impact do you read in
4 from the paper --

5 [REDACTED] Can we pause for a moment?

6 [REDACTED] Sure.

7 [REDACTED] We just had a new member join. Can you confirm your identity,
8 please?

9 Mr. Bakaj. Yeah, this is Andrew Bakaj. I had to call in because I lost
10 connectivity.

11 [REDACTED] Oh, so it was you and Libby? Okay. Great. Well, thanks,
12 Andrew, and we'll wait and see if Libby also joins.

13 Sorry, [REDACTED] go ahead.

14 [REDACTED] That's fine. There's someone waiting in the lobby as well, so
15 that might be Libby.

16 [REDACTED] Hi, someone just joined on the phone, we look at it as in the lobby.
17 Can you identify yourself, please?

18 Ms. Liu. Sure. Can you hear me? This is Libby. I lost internet, so I'm coming
19 in via cell phone now.

20 [REDACTED] Great. It sounds like Andrew, for some reason, also got
21 disconnected, but you are both in on the phone now, and we'll keep an eye out if you're
22 also trying to connect via the link. But --

23 Mr. Bakaj. Understood.

24 Ms. Liu. Okay. Thanks so much.

25 Mr. Bakaj. Thank you, thank you.

1 Ms. Liu. Must be a Northern Virginia problem, huh?

2 Thank you.

3 Mr. Bakaj. Must be.

4 [REDACTED]

5 Q So when this study was done, did Facebook tend to lead people towards
6 more extreme content?

7 A Unless significant changes have been made, which I am not aware of,
8 Facebook would continue to behave in this way, like, going forward. Like, as long as MSI
9 and downstream MSI are core parts of the ranking, you would continue to see this
10 behavior.

11 Q Okay. And if Facebook put in break the glass measures around the
12 election, would that have maybe tamped down the severity of this?

13 A So I think it's important to remember -- yes. So the break the glass
14 measures are, like, putting a brake on a car, right? So, you know, if you only put the
15 brake on a little bit, the car slows just down a little. If you put a bigger brake on, the car
16 slows down more, or it might even stop.

17 And the break the glass measures act like -- they're intended to be usually kind of
18 tactical. So in terms of, you know, being able to identify specific parts of the community
19 that are -- are potentially in conflict, and the intention is for people to be exposed to less
20 harmful content or to have the system be weaponized less.

21 Q Okay. So if -- there's a period around the election, but people were also
22 using Facebook in the period in 2020 when the break the glass measures were not on.

23 A Yes.

24 Q And once people tend to get radicalized or tend to have their Facebook
25 experience include more radical content, does that tend to persist over time?

1 A Yes. There's a -- a person who might be interesting for you guys to talk to
2 is, there's a guy who invented a plug-in called Unfollow, but it's based around -- based
3 around the idea that, you know, you shouldn't have to give up your Facebook account to
4 give up the model that is pushing content at you.

5 So he made a Chrome plug-in that allowed you to mass unfollow, like, the groups
6 and pages and stuff that you were associated with. And Facebook threatened to sue
7 him. So even though this was like a voluntary thing, you know, like someone could in
8 there and be, like, I just don't want to follow all this stuff, but I don't want to have to sit
9 there and click unfollow, like, 500 times.

10 This was a sufficient -- Facebook viewed this as a sufficient threat that they
11 threatened to sue him and made him take it down.

12 Q And how was it a threat?

13 A And that's publicly reported, like, you can -- you can find that.
14 Can you say that again?

15 Q And how was it a threat?

16 A So remember how I said before that, like, the world of Facebook where you
17 only get content from your family and friends, you don't consume as much content as you
18 do in the world as currently constructed by Facebook. And so having people follow less
19 things, follow less pages, be members of fewer groups, that directly costs Facebook
20 money because you spend less time onsite.

21 Q And just to -- just to get some facts in the record --

22 A Uh-huh.

23 Q -- on page 15, this document says that in less than a week after opening the
24 account, the test account, Facebook recommended an explicit QAnon recommendation,
25 and before that, it had recommended implicit QAnon content.

1 So do you have -- we're going to turn to another document, but is there anything
2 else you think is important to mention about this document?

3 A I think the fact that so rapidly people are exposed to quite extreme
4 content -- actually, I think there's some really good -- one second. I want to pull that
5 document up real quick. Because from what I remember of that doc -- give me just 2
6 seconds. I think there's some recommendations in that doc, if I remember. Or they
7 might be in the Karen one. But we'll check one and then we'll look at the other. Next
8 point. Oop, oop. Okay. Carol -- oh, shoot. Data. All right. I'm almost there.
9 Carol.

10 Okay. So part of what's interesting about this doc is -- and there might be, like I
11 was saying, the Karen one might be even better. [Inaudible] high quality.

12 So the -- the findings at the top of the doc say it took it less than 1 week to get a
13 QAnon recommendation, not 15 days.

14 Q Sorry. That was page 15, less than a week.

15 A Okay. I'm sorry. So I think a couple things that are interesting are, like,
16 how concentrated the groups' recommendations are. It's like they make a comment
17 about how it took very little time for the groups you should join to become completely
18 saturated with just political and right-leaning content.

19 You know, you could imagine doing a design where you intentionally are trying to
20 integrate people into the broader community, and this shows how it's basically just
21 optimizing for -- in AI systems, there's a concept known as exploit versus explore. So
22 this is like a generalized concept around all recommender systems.

23 When you are exploiting, you are trying to optimize as much as possible for what
24 you already know about someone. And explore is like, oh, let's make sure we expose
25 people to more things, because we might be overfocused in. From what this sounds

1 like, it sounds like they are overoptimized on exploit over explore.

2 Low quality -- actually, one more thing you guys should pay attention to is on -- I
3 don't know which page this is. I think it's like page 4. It says, several of the pages and
4 groups shared problematic content and had other markers of low quality, violating
5 ownership or activity, such as high number of CO deletes -- so that's country operation
6 deletes -- for admins are in pages and groups with overlapping sets of admins.

7 So the reason why this is an important phrase, is, if you have overlapping sets of
8 admins, it means that you have a coordinated movement going on. So this is a huge
9 problem with QAnon, where you had clusters of accounts that were going and being the
10 administrators and promoters of groups of pages.

11 And so what this is saying is that, you know, the algorithm, once you start falling
12 down the rabbit hole, it ends up pushing you into -- into like a -- into like a kind of an echo
13 chamber, that as the next point there says explicitly, that part of the problem with this
14 content is that they've gotten coordinated, inauthentic behavior violations, right, where,
15 you know, a number of these groups have admins that have already lost other groups for
16 coordinated, inauthentic behavior, which is a huge problem.

17 So -- so what basically this doc says is that Facebook knew they were -- they were
18 pushing people into groups that had these integrity -- known integrity issues.

19 Q Okay.

20 A Interesting. Okay. That's enough. I'll let you climb. Yeah.

21 Q We're going to move now to document 7, which I'm going to mark as exhibit

22 G. This is the Stop the Steal and Patriot Party --

23 A Uh-huh.

24 Q -- the Growth and Mitigation of an Adversarial Harmful Movement
25 document.

1 A Yep, yep.

2 Q So first question, you produced this document to the committee?

3 A Yes.

4 Q Yeah. And do you know when it was written?

5 A It was written -- wait, like, I'm looking at it real close. It would have been
6 written in March of 2021, or at least last edited March of 2021.

7 Q And are you familiar with this document?

8 A I am.

9 Q And so what do you think the main takeaways are that the committee
10 should know from this document?

11 I could ask some specific questions too.

12 A So one -- yeah, why don't you ask me some specific questions.

13 Q Sure.

14 A Yeah, good.

15 Q So let's go page 3.

16 A Uh-huh.

17 Q Well, first of all, let's go to -- before we do that, Jeffrey Horwitz and Justin
18 Scheck wrote an article called Facebook Increasingly Suppresses Political Movements It
19 Deems Dangerous, and I believe they described this as a targeted approach that was
20 controversial within Facebook.

21 And we can pull up document 9 and mark that as exhibit H. That's the article.
22 And if you go to page 4, that's the quote, if you want some context. But I just --

23 A Yep, yep.

24 Q -- I just wonder if -- if you -- what your reaction is, and if you agree that this
25 was a targeted approach that was controversial within Facebook?

1 A So this document plus the document on information corridors, which may be
2 an exhibit later on --

3 [REDACTED] Oh. Did everyone else lose her?

4 Mr. Bakaj. It sounds like it.

5 [REDACTED] Frances?

6 [REDACTED] Yeah, I lost her too.

7 [REDACTED] Okay. We'll wait.

8 Voice. The connectivity on the island has been, you know, shaken.

9 Voice. Sure.

10 Voice. Though it is kind of ironic that we in Northern Virginia apparently this
11 entire area has also lost connectivity, so -- anyway.

12 [REDACTED] Bad timing. Would one of you want to just text her and let her
13 know that she's talking into the ether if she's talking?

14 Voice. Yeah.

15 Voice. Where are the rest of you physically located that you still have internet?

16 [REDACTED] I'm in D.C.

17 [REDACTED] So am I.

18 D.C. is still good.

19 [REDACTED] Me as well.

20 [REDACTED] Let me check.

21 Voice. We are -- Northern Virginia is down.

22 Voice. I see Frances has joined from another device.

23 Frances, can you hear us?

24 Mr. Bakaj. I just got a text from her saying she's trying to get back in.

25 [REDACTED] Okay, great.

1 Mr. Bakaj. And just to let you know, sometimes she does have connectivity
2 issues as well on the island, so she does at times switch from her laptop to her phone
3 because her phone is actually I think a little bit more stable. So that could -- if you're
4 seeing a different device come in, it could be her.

5 [REDACTED] That's fine. It looks like I see her now, but she might be on a
6 different device.

7 Frances, can you hear us?

8 Voice. For the court reporter, why don't we go off the record until we resolve
9 this technical issue.

10 [REDACTED] Okay.

11 [Recess.]

12 [REDACTED] Okay. Let's go back on the record.

13 BY [REDACTED]

14 Q Before there were some connection issues -- we're back on the record.
15 Before there were some connection issues, I had asked you about whether you agreed
16 with the statement that this was a targeted approach that was controversial within
17 Facebook.

18 A So, you know, Facebook had lots and lots of options other than making
19 tactical choices to pull Stop the Steal or the Patriot Party off of Facebook, right? You
20 know, they could have chosen lower rate limits for like how many people could be invited
21 to groups. They could have changed things about how they recommended groups.
22 They could have changed things, like, should you receive content from people before you
23 choose to join a group, all these things.

24 But because Facebook chose to run the system really, really hot, by the time Stop
25 the Steal or the Patriot Party started to become, you know, illicit, real-world violence, like

1 it induced real-world violence, they didn't have a lot of options other than to remove
2 them from the platform.

3 One of the things that is more difficult about one of these movements -- and
4 they're classified as adversarial movements to differentiate between, you know, imagine
5 a social movement, you know, is full of authentic actors that are using the platform to
6 organize some kind of movement, versus people who are actively trying to get around
7 Facebook's safety offenses.

8 When you have one of these movements that is actionably weaponizing the
9 platform, you have to have more subtle tools for detecting who is driving the movement,
10 for being able to see the trends that are, like, the ways that people are recruited or
11 activated.

12 And what Jeff is referring to here is that they developed technologies, like
13 information corridors, for being able to understand who was actively pushing ideas
14 through these networks, who were the ones who were causing the networks to grow.
15 Because if you can find the, you know, 1 percent of people who are both the recruiters
16 and the amplifiers and the people who actually generate the ideas, you can, in a tactical
17 way, remove those people from the system or down-ramp them. Presumably, you can
18 make it so that just those people can't invite people to groups anymore, or they can invite
19 fewer people to groups per day.

20 And so I do agree with Jeff's assessment that this is like a targeted intervention,
21 like, it's very focused. It's not like just making the system safer. It's choosing to
22 remove an actor from the platform after the risk to the company becomes too large.

23 Q Thank you.

24 Moving back to exhibit G, which is the original document we were talking about,
25 the Stop the Steal and Patriot Party doc.

1 A Uh-huh.

2 Q On page 3 of that, it says, from the earliest groups, we saw high levels of
3 hate, V&I, and delegitimization combined with meteoric growth rates.

4 So how did Facebook define delegitimization?

5 A I believe -- so there's some interesting documents elsewhere that talk about
6 the idea of the emergence of the concept of delegitimization and how, like, it required
7 writing policy around. So delegitimization, I believe, refers to saying, like, the election is
8 not valid when the election was held in a free and, like, observed manner. And so I
9 believe that's what delegitimization is.

10 Q Okay. Thank you.

11 Moving on to page 20, you mentioned information corridors. What resources
12 are necessary to set one up?

13 A To set up -- to be able to discover one or for --

14 Q Yeah.

15 A -- like an individual on the platform to be able to, like, build out of an
16 information corridor?

17 Q To be able to discover one.

18 A You know, I have not read through this paper in a super close way. I'm
19 guessing it requires setting -- so if it is anything like a CORGI pipeline, which is -- which is
20 discussed -- I know there's discussions of using systems like CORGI or maybe even using
21 parts of CORGI in order to do this --

22 Q What does CORGI -- spelled C-O-R-G-I -- what does that stand for, do you
23 remember?

24 A It's like coordinated something something graph. Like, it's something about
25 finding coordination between different entities. I've -- I've -- I've helped design CORGI

1 pipelines. I do not know all of the math on, like, how the embeddings work for it, but if
2 it's anything like what you do for a CORGI pipeline, you define the kinds of focus you want
3 to have in the system.

4 So you might say I'm going to look at key words, or I'm going to look at people's
5 membership in groups, or I'm going to look at the administrators of groups. And you
6 would, once you defined those inputs, you would run a pipeline, and it would probably
7 take you a couple of days, I would guess, like maybe a day, maybe 2 days for the system
8 to, like, churn through all the data. And then it would give you, I'm guessing, these
9 clusters that would allow you to see people who were engaged in certain ways. But I
10 have never set up an information corridor pipeline for myself.

11 Q Okay. And if we go could two more pages down, please. There. If you
12 look in the middle of the page --

13 A But just for context, I did actively work with the team that developed this.
14 So the data scientist that developed this specific thing, she was on the same working
15 group with me around adversarial harmful networks.

16 Q Okay. So the information corridor on this page is blue, and the sentence
17 says, we've also built tools, parentheses, information corridor.

18 Is this a tool for detecting an information corridor, is that what you're saying?

19 A Yes. So information corridors are like finding who are those people who
20 are the ones bringing people into the movement, who are those people pushing the ideas
21 and amplifying them. And there's a document on information corridors, which I think
22 you have, that details exactly what an information corridor is.

23 Q All right. Let's go down two more pages, and then I have some questions
24 about what Facebook should have done immediately after banning Stop the Steal.

25 On page 22, if you look at the top bullet, it says, there are many lessons -- well,

1 before the bullet, it says, "there are many lessons we can take away." And one of the
2 bullets is early focus on individual violations made us miss the harm in the broader
3 network.

4 A Uh-huh.

5 Q What does that mean?

6 A So when you -- so one challenge of Facebook's integrity -- overall integrity
7 strategy is -- and you can see this in things, like, they have established the entire oversight
8 board to focus on this -- is that they have focused disproportionately on viral pieces of
9 misinformation or like viral pieces of hate speech. They have focused on the head,
10 instead of focusing on the aggregate volume of the tail.

11 So I'll give you an example. When they've gone and studied the relative volume
12 of -- of viral misinformation versus narrow cast misinformation -- so that's where you
13 send information targeted at a specific community, at a specific geography, you know, a
14 sociographic group -- the volume of -- of narrow cast misinformation is, I think, two to
15 three times larger than the volume of misinformation for viral misinformation.

16 But because Facebook's whole moderation strategy is around the idea of like, you
17 know, you can't deal with all the content but you can deal with the highest severity
18 content, they -- I could -- I could totally imagine what happened is, there might have
19 been, in aggregate, a huge amount of chatter that was being driven by this network.
20 Right? So one of the things that's discussed either in this document or in the
21 information corridors document, I don't remember which, is they talk about the idea that
22 a very small number of people were driving the introduction of these ideas and then like
23 cross-feeding it across the network. Or like a very small number of people were inviting
24 people into these networks.

25 And so in aggregate, you know, you might have hundreds of posts that each get

1 seen tens of thousands of times, but a post that gets seen tens of thousands of times isn't
2 considered important at Facebook. Right? It's -- you know, if you get seen hundreds
3 of thousands of times or millions of time, then you would be important enough.

4 And so I can totally imagine a thing where they were focused on, you know, war
5 stories getting reported by third-party fact-checking versus was there kind of this large
6 diffuse tidal wave of harm. And that's part of why they invented things like the
7 information corridors work, is, they wanted to be able to actually be able to identify and
8 quantify, like, what is an amorphous set of harm, instead of just like a super viral single
9 post.

10 Q And the fourth bullet point says: We have little policy around coordinated
11 authentic harm.

12 A Yes.

13 Q What does that --

14 A So -- so -- so at Facebook, because you are required to be -- use your real
15 name, if they can demonstrate that someone is acting inauthentically, then that is a very
16 easy way to bring down a network of actors. So if you can come in there and find a
17 network that claims to be moms from Atlanta but everyone's IP address is from Russia,
18 you can say, you are clearly acting in inauthentic manner, and you can get taken down.

19 But one of the things that was common across Stop the Steal and Patriot Party
20 was these were authentic actors, right? They were not misconstruing who they were;
21 they were -- but they were trying to work around Facebook's safety systems. You know,
22 they try to have backup groups so that when one group gets taken down, they can fall
23 back on another group. They ask people for their email addresses so they can invite
24 them to other things. And so that's -- and they don't -- that was like a major gap in
25 Facebook's safety strategy, and that was one of the things that our working group was

1 trying to resolve at the time that I left the company.

2 Q And is that related to the -- later on this page, it mentions the disaggregating
3 harmful networks task force and the adversarial harmful networks policy?

4 A Yes.

5 Q Great. Let's move to document 10, if we don't mind. We're going to call
6 that exhibit I. This is the document called February 2020 Civic Integrity Reorg.

7 A Okay.

8 Q All right. So did you produce this document to the committee?

9 A Yes.

10 Q And are you familiar with this document?

11 A Yes.

12 Q Do you know what problem this document is meant to be addressing?

13 A So I know what they claimed it was trying to address, which was -- I want to
14 make sure I have exact -- I'm looking at exactly the right thing. Specific integrity,
15 specific --

16 Q We have it up on our screen, but it's --

17 A I can't see, like -- like, I want to scroll a little further up. And so, like, part
18 of --

19 Q Okay.

20 A It's interesting, I'm trying to see who wrote it, that kind of thing. I think it's
21 by Guy Rosen. Oh, you guys can't see it.

22 Q We don't see it.

23 A Give me -- give me just one quick second.

24 A Ah, I got it. Okay. So that's actually by Kashkik Iyer, that notice, and -- so it's
25 from February 7th, 2020. Oh, this is -- actually, this is a slightly different doc. This is

1 not the one I thought it was. Give me one sec.

2 Okay, good. So this is actually an earlier document, I thought. So I -- yes.

3 So -- okay. No, I do know. So this is the reorg that happened right after the -- this
4 happened right after the Iowa caucuses.

5 So I think what was intended to be solved with this -- this reorg was, they wanted
6 to put a lot more emphasis on like the rapid response pod. So, like, there was a group
7 that was like building out the war room software.

8 And I remember, coming out of this reorg, that was a much bigger pod. And they
9 repositioned some of the remaining pods because, like, the team that I was working on,
10 our engineering manager did not have the right skill set for the work that we were doing,
11 like, he didn't have like a data or, like, an AI background.

12 And so the engineers that I had been working on when this reorg happened got
13 moved under a different engineering manager, another team, so that there was
14 more -- just because, like, there was that misalignment of skills.

15 Beyond that, though, I don't know the other reasons for this reorg.

16 Q Okay. Can we go to page 3?

17 A Uh-huh.

18 Q This has three pillars: the ecosystem pillar, the problem pillar, and the
19 crisis pillar. And so can you use this to maybe explain what you were saying so that we
20 have a visual?

21 A So -- so the group that was the working on the, like, war room
22 software -- so they're called IPOCs, Integrated Product Operation Centers -- that would
23 have been under the crisis pillar. And then --

24 Q Before you move on with IPOCs, what's an L3 IPOC?

25 A I'm guessing that is a level 3 IPOC. I don't -- I don't know what the tiering of

1 the different levels are, though.

2 Q Okay. Sorry. Carry on. Thank you.

3 A Ah, okay. So I think another part of what was good on this one was, so you
4 see the part where it discusses the three infrastructure pods? So CORGI is an
5 infrastructure, right, it's like the thing that finds the coordination. Measurement and
6 classification was trying to set up common infrastructure for things like hate speech
7 classifier, voter disenfranchisement classifier, that kind of thing. And then civic data was
8 the group that would ingest external data feeds on things like who are politicians.

9 And so all those got moved under ecosystems, it looks like. Beyond that, I don't
10 know a lot about this.

11 Q So, generally, how --

12 A Do you have any more specific questions?

13 Q Generally, how were pillars -- how were pillars used? What were
14 they -- what were they?

15 A Pillars were just organizational units. So, like, you know I was talking about
16 my [inaudible] team, it has become -- became segmentation infrastructure. So that
17 you've seen other ones that talk about like how misinformation is concentrated in certain
18 segments. It's the same kind of thing.

19 Pillars just give you a place to have like a home, right? So you might have a
20 handful of teams that all are under that pillar, and they might have like a weekly meeting,
21 or they might share like an engineering manager.

22 Q And if we go back up to 1, I just want to note that it looks like Civic Integrity's
23 mission at the time was to strengthen societies by ensuring our platforms are safe and
24 trusted for civic engagement. I think that was a question we had last time. Does that
25 sound right?

1 A Yeah.

2 Q Okay. We're going to move on to another document unless you have
3 anything you want to pause us on here.

4 A Nope. Nope.

5 Q Okay. This is going to be J, and this is document 11, exhibit J. This one is
6 called CIPGO Roadmaps and Reviews.

7 A Uh-huh.

8 Q Well, that's actually -- that looks like it's the name of the group. On that
9 page, it says timeline updated CIPCO, problem roadmap priorities/guidance H1 2021.
10 So did you produce this document to the committee?

11 A Yes.

12 Q And are you familiar with it?

13 A I am -- I know that I've read it at some point. Yeah, I'm just looking at it
14 right now.

15 Okay. Go. Yep, I'm good. I'm familiar with it, but it's not a thing where like it
16 jumps out at me as like a -- but, yeah, what are your questions?

17 Q So this is December 11th, this is after the reorganization, after the election,
18 right?

19 A Yes. Yep.

20 Q So what is CIPCO?

21 A So I believe CIPCO -- so CIPCO, so it's community integrity product, I
22 think -- community integrity product in country operations, I think. I'm not entirely sure.
23 But CIPCO is kind of like the umbrella, like, umbrella org that's over most of the things
24 that we would consider integrity. And once Civic Integrity was dissolved, it got folded
25 under CIPCO.

1 Q And if you look at page 8, it looks like there's two kind of documents in this
2 one document. So I just want to know how these documents flow together.
3 That's -- keep going.

4 A Yeah.

5 Q This is the next -- this is the document I want to ask about --

6 A Sure.

7 Q -- why there's a format break here.

8 A I'm guessing that's because -- let's see. I'm guessing that's because -- I bet
9 if you go towards the top of that doc, there's probably a link to like the lookback on the
10 year. That's my guess. I'm just seeing if I can see if there's an obvious link that links
11 the two.

12 It may also just be that I didn't split them up where, like, I had one and when I was
13 overjoyed putting everything into folders, sometimes things just didn't get split apart.

14 But looking at this right now, I'm guessing this is -- this is a lookback.

15 So within CIPCO, there are different clusters, and this is for the Protecting People
16 cluster. Yeah, I think these are not necessarily directly related. I think I just forgot to
17 divide them when I was, like, separating out all the documents.

18 Q Okay. That's fine. Let's go back up to 1.

19 A Okay. Yep.

20 Q How were ops requests prioritized?

21 A Ah. So ops requests, if I remember correctly, were kind of quantified in the
22 number of hours you thought you would need from that team for the quarter or the half.
23 Beyond that, I don't know how they were prioritized, like, I don't know who got theirs
24 filed and who didn't.

25 My understanding is there was a relatively, like -- they knew how many total hours

1 they had available to allocate. And part of why they would ask you for like your
2 requests early is they could try to lobby to get more capacity that would allow them to
3 meet your request, but, like, you didn't know if you were going to get your request.

4 Q So these ops resources were working on more than just civic integrity or
5 community integrity products?

6 A Yeah.

7 Q Okay.

8 A Yeah. They probably also had some ops people who were working on
9 things like account integrity, which is out of a different -- a different part of the company.
10 But, yeah, ops people can be cross-trained or can be moved into different pods.

11 And so part of it is around because they're contractors, like, it's a question of like
12 how many people do you hire and like who do you train to do what.

13 Q Great. And who decides how many resources went to address -- how many
14 ops resources went to address which requests?

15 A Who got to decide?

16 Q Who decided that? Yeah.

17 A I'm guessing -- I'm guessing people put in their requests, and then the ops
18 team came up with a budget, and then that probably came back to the product teams to
19 be like, hey, like, this is -- this is what we're going to fund. And then I'm guessing
20 probably -- like, just if this is anything like other kinds of funding cycles.

21 So I never engaged in this process, to be clear, like, I was -- my products were too
22 early in the life cycle to do them. You -- I'm sure there was a way where like if ops did
23 not fund your thing but, like, say the VP of -- you know, if Guy Rosen said we need
24 funding for it, they would probably then go find funding.

25 But I don't -- I don't know if they had like a formula or if they, like, allocate -- I

1 know that for other things involving limited resources, they would look at like how many
2 users of Facebook were in each country, or, like, you know, what was the -- the sensitivity
3 of that country.

4 So, for example, the United States, Facebook would put more resources into
5 keeping it safe because, like, the United States could regulate Facebook. So those kinds
6 of things came into play.

7 Q Okay. Let's move down to page 6, back down to page 6. Yeah. It says,
8 What do we expect teams to not trade off to make these investments? And the
9 investments are outlined further up. And one of the things that is in this category is
10 spikes. It says, We expect teams to be vigilant to spikes in their operational metrics and
11 continue to do RCAs to understand metric moves.

12 A Uh-huh.

13 Q What are operational metrics, what is an RCA, and what does it mean to
14 understand metric moves?

15 A So operational metrics, like, maybe your team is the team responsible for, I
16 don't know, civic spam or something, and suddenly you see a spike, you might need to do
17 a little fire drill to figure out like is this spike real or is it an error in your logging platform.
18 If it is real, what's driving it, and you might need to go address it.

19 And, like, what they're saying -- I think those things they were talking about
20 above -- I haven't reread this recently, but I believe the stuff that is above is around
21 becoming like more efficient in developing things like AIs, like, having more shared
22 systems and things like that.

23 So saying, you know, you still need to be vigilant to spikes means, like, you need to
24 be able to, like, if a crisis happens, you still need to be able to respond to it. You can't
25 say I was focused on these other goals because -- and so I didn't pay attention to my

1 metrics.

2 Q And this was December 11th?

3 A Yes.

4 Q And this is CIPGO. Does that include integrity staff?

5 A It would have been the organization that we were under after Civic Integrity
6 was dissolved -- or the vast majority of us would have been under.

7 Q All right. Let's go to page 7. So this is the first 2 weeks of the -- of the
8 year, and it says roadmapping activities, focus on PSC.

9 A Ah. So PSCs are the performance reviews that people do. I don't
10 remember what the acronym stands for. But PSCs are, people write peer reviews for
11 everybody and do self-reviews, and it takes up quite a big deal of time. I think it takes
12 up, like, almost like a full week or maybe even 2 weeks, depending on how many reviews
13 you have to write.

14 Q And this was designated to be taking place in the week of January 4th to 8th,
15 correct?

16 A Yes. And for context for people, often people will, like, very actively unplug
17 during that period of time. So, like, people in order to, like, be able to get through all
18 their reviews they'll, like, you know -- back when people -- when working from home
19 wasn't standard, people might work from home in order to like not be distracted. And
20 so people might have been -- I can totally imagine people were, like, heads down on
21 January 6th, or in the lead-up to it, if they were working on their peer reviews.

22 Q And so this gets us a little bit into what we were talking about last time, but
23 who should have been pulling people off of those projects to either monitor spikes or
24 prepare in other ways for January 6th if they would have seen it coming?

25 A So once Samidh was no longer in charge of Civic Integrity, I'm not exactly

1 sure who that person would have been. I guess Guy Rosen would be -- would make
2 sense as, like, the logical person.

3 Part of what's a little difficult on PSCs is -- yes, they have 2 full weeks for PSCs.
4 God, I don't even know if people were back from vacation that week, like the Jan. 4th to
5 Jan. 6th week. But, yeah, if people were working, like -- and part of -- part of what's also
6 interesting about that in terms of distraction is, the higher up the leadership chain you
7 are, the worse your PSCs are because you have more people potentially who you need to
8 write reviews for.

9 And so that could have been another factor that was distracting in the leadership
10 by Facebook, was, it's very possible that whoever would have been the responsible party
11 at that point was high enough up that they had a lot of PSCs to deal with.

12 Q Are PSCs the kind of thing that can be put off?

13 A Anything can be put off, but you would need to have someone who could
14 actually like, you know, change that schedule. Because it's -- it's administered through
15 an application that -- and so, like, you know, I'm sure there's a way to like change those
16 deadlines. But you would need to have someone who could come in there and say, like,
17 we're going to change these deadlines for X, Y, Z people.

18 Q Okay. We're going to move to the second document in this document. Is
19 there anything else about this table that you think is interesting or the document before
20 we move?

21 A Nothing I can think of.

22 Q Okay. So going on to page 8, if you look at the first paragraph, it says -- this
23 is in the H2 2020 overview. It says --

24 A Uh-huh.

25 Q -- sentence, and second, SME bandwidth was limited.

1 What is SME bandwidth?

2 A Subject matter expert. So you could imagine -- one second. I don't -- I
3 don't know necessarily what SMEs would be doing in this context. So you could
4 imagine -- so one of the ways that SMEs were used in Civic Integrity was they had
5 linguists, for example, who spoke languages that were spoken in the area's countries, and
6 they would help classify content.

7 So when they say subject matter -- SME bandwidth was limited, it might be a thing
8 where, like, they didn't have enough people in the problem areas they wanted to be
9 focusing on. It might have been that those people were -- were busy doing, like, more
10 crisis-related activities. I just don't know.

11 Q Okay. Let's move to the table starting on page 11 of this document, it's
12 called H1 2021 H2 roadmap table. And there are some sub tables in here, and we're
13 going to turn to the one that is violence incitement. So let's go to page 15.

14 A Uh-huh.

15 Q And on -- I'm sorry. Let's go to page 18. Oh, I'm sorry. You just started
16 scrolling. Let's go back to 15.

17 So under violence in segment number 2, it says, preparatory statements. We
18 have seen an increase in content calling for civil war and calls to take up arms, particularly
19 in the U.S. and in Ethiopia. We plan to do a PPF policy development on this in each one.

20 What does this mean to you?

21 A So in order to like have a new type of content where you would say, like, this
22 content is not permitted, you have to go through like a policy development process. I
23 don't know what the acronym PPF stands for. I could look it up in the docs, but I'm not
24 aware of exactly what that statement is.

25 Q Okay. And then let's go on to 18. And there we have number 7, calls for

1 state violence. Implement and operationalize the framework concerning state actors'
2 calls for force. Currently awaiting further leadership guidance. Note, OCP are now
3 playing a more supportive role here, so the priority is no longer P zero.

4 And then in the last column, it says medium, dependent on leadership sign-off.

5 What are called for state violence on Facebook?

6 A Just to make sure I'm on the -- oh, I see it. Are now playing OCP. Calls for
7 state violence. Impeachment and operationalize and implement [inaudible] state actors
8 concerning [inaudible].

9 So I think -- I think this is -- it's like when an individual says, you know, there
10 should be a coup, right, like, you know, Mike Pence should stop counting votes. I'm not
11 saying -- or it must be more than that, because calls for state violence would mean like
12 shoot the protesters or things like that. I don't know the exact details on it. I didn't
13 work on them.

14 Q Okay. I don't think there's anything else on this document. Let's move on
15 to document 15, which we're going to now call exhibit K. That is called IPOC boot camp
16 training.

17 Did you produce this document to the committee?

18 A Yes.

19 Q And are you familiar with this document?

20 A Yes.

21 Q Going on to page 2 --

22 A What's a little interesting about this document, so if you look on page 1, the
23 agenda is dated to January 12th, 2021. And as a general rule, like, when they would
24 stand up IPOCs for events, they would staff them up, you know, in advance of a thing, and
25 they would do something like hold a training. And so the fact that there's this training

1 doc that's dated January 12th, I think is very interesting. But I don't know if that has any
2 actual significance. It just seems an odd coincidence, but, cool.

3 Oh, actually, interesting. There's stuff -- there's stuff further down. If you look
4 on page 4 --

5 Q Yes.

6 A -- so they have -- yeah, yeah. So it looks like they did do a little bit starting
7 on Jan. 4. Interesting.

8 Q Where are you seeing that?

9 A If you go down to page 4, it says, proactive pod lead daily prioritizations at
10 that sync, Jan. 4 through 22. So it looks like they might have started doing a little bit on
11 Jan. 4.

12 Q And if you look further up, there's a reference to the Capitol
13 crisis/inauguration IPOC stand-ups event.

14 A Okay. One sec. Okay. Yep, I see it.

15 Q There were, I believe, also references in this document to a Georgia IPOC?

16 A Uh-huh.

17 Q So that may have been --

18 A For the Georgia runoff elections?

19 Q Let me -- let me see if I can find that reference.

20 Oh, yeah, if you go to page 7 --

21 A Uh-huh.

22 Q -- there's a reference to the Capitol crisis/Georgia runoff standup log. So
23 that --

24 A Cool. Okay.

25 Q Okay. And if you go -- let's go down to page 8 now.

1 A Okay.

2 Q It says that there is a -- in the first paragraph, it says there's a Storm the
3 Capitol IPOC.

4 A Uh-huh.

5 Q Is it common that there are this many IPOCs going on at the same time or --

6 A No. No.

7 Q -- are these all the same kinds of names for the similar IPOC? What -- what
8 would you --

9 A I'm guessing they all were being held out of the same -- oh, actually, this was
10 during COVID, so it would have been distributed. So, no, this is not normal, like,
11 generally, there are not this many simultaneous IPOCs. Like, usually there's like an IPOC
12 at a time, not multiple ones. If -- if one at all. Like, it has to be something big, like the
13 German elections or the U.S. elections.

14 Q Okay. Do you recall when this picture was taken? Because according to
15 page 8, there was still an additional 15 levers in the pipeline.

16 A No. Give me one second. I can get that real quick. IPOC training. So I
17 photographed this doc on May 16th. So I don't know when it was last edited, unless
18 there's a timestamp on the doc. Yes, this was done via Quip, and Quips are a little
19 harder because unless there's comments, you don't really get a good timestamp. So,
20 unfortunately, I don't -- I don't know for sure when this doc was last edited.

21 Q Okay. Let's go to page 15, which is the last page, and there's a proactive
22 pod prioritization model.

23 A Okay.

24 Q So just take a look at this. Get familiar with it.

25 When prioritizing information in the matrix, on page 15, it appears that one of the

1 main things, based on the axes that Facebook was concerned about, was discoverability
2 as well as severity. What did discoverability mean?

3 A I think discoverability -- that's an interesting question. Oh, let me see.
4 I'm looking at it. Okay. Discoverability -- oh, wow.

5 So it looks like discoverability is, like, would the media notice it, right, and like
6 would it cause reputational harm? Because one of the axes is, like, little media
7 coverage, like, little to no media coverage, you know, unlikely to cause offline harm,
8 reputational damage, versus things that are like very discoverable and are severe, which
9 is like widespread media coverage. You know, it's -- it's easy to like do a search and just
10 see the content.

11 So you can imagine a thing where, like, a lot of the harm was happening in closed
12 groups that were invite-only, and that would be harder to discover, right? Like, if it's an
13 issue that isn't in the media already and it's harder to discover it, that would be not
14 discoverable, that kind of thing.

15 Q And as you've called out --

16 A Yeah.

17 Q -- I think the fourth bullet in each of these squares has both the likelihood of
18 causing offline harm and the amount of reputational damage.

19 A Yes.

20 Q What does that tell you, if anything?

21 A This is like a common thread across, like, Facebook's integrity actions. Like,
22 there's no way that you would put Germany in with like countries that are actively
23 engaging in like a civil war, like, ethnic violence, unless a big part of how you're
24 prioritizing your resources was around reputational damage.

25 I don't have documentation on this. Like, this is just something that I heard in a

1 meeting. But, like, we were told at some point that the budget for Civic Integrity came
2 out of the antitrust budget. Like, there was a feeling that if Facebook really messed up
3 the 2020 election, that, like, Facebook could get broken up.

4 And so this idea of that, like, what matters more than, like, the actual harm is, like,
5 how Facebook is blamed for that harm, is like a thing that happens over and over again
6 inside the company.

7 Q And Facebook cares about whether people link it to January 6th?

8 A Almost certainly, right, like, Facebook has come out like Bosworth came out
9 last week and said stuff about, like, how you can't blame us for misinformation or hate
10 speech because, like, people like those things.

11 Q And what's your reaction to Bosworth's statement?

12 A There's a really good tweet by Samidh Chakrabarti, who was the former
13 head of Civic Integrity, that he put out right after that, where he has a framework that he
14 claims he developed while he was at Facebook -- I don't know if that's true or not, but it
15 seems plausible -- where he lays out how do you assign responsibility for actions. And it
16 asks questions like, would you have had the same problem over email, would you have
17 had the same problem in a paid subscription model, would you have had the same
18 problem in, you know -- like, in different contexts. And I think he -- he does the best
19 explanation for why Facebook is responsible.

20 Facebook is not like a neutral actor here, right? Like, Facebook knew that it was
21 giving the most reach, the most extreme and polarizing content, and didn't do anything
22 about it. And they could have been disseminating substantially less misinformation.
23 We're talking 20, 30, 50, 60, 70 percent less misinformation for very small tradeoffs with
24 profits. We're talking like single-digit tradeoffs to the profits. And so at some point,
25 they have to be responsible. Like, Facebook has to take responsibility for the fact that

1 there was a way worse information environment that was substantially more incendiary
2 because Facebook didn't want to give up slivers of profit. Period.

3 Q And how much control do you think Facebook has over important parts of
4 the information market, I think you called it? Information ecosystem, whatever you
5 called it.

6 A Yeah. Facebook dramatically changes the composition of the ecosystem
7 based on product choices. So that's things like -- they have a group picker that lets you
8 share out to multiple groups simultaneously. And The Washington Post has done some
9 really great journalism on detailing why that multipicker is dangerous, right? Because it
10 means that you have people now basically acting as -- doing the exact same, like, just
11 everyday people doing the kinds of activities that used to be, you know, your Russian
12 information operations were doing, you know, just spraying and preying out
13 misinformation to as many groups as possible.

14 And, like, that -- that feature Facebook knew was spreading more misinformation,
15 and they kept it up because, like, it -- it helps with the amount of content in the
16 ecosystem, right? People stay on the sites longer. They have more content in their
17 feeds. It makes groups grow more quickly. And so it's just one of those things where,
18 like, Facebook made choices to trade off safety and profit, and consistently they chose
19 profit over safety.

20 Q Okay. Unless you have anything else on this document, let's turn to
21 document 16.

22 A Okay.

23 Q Let's mark this exhibit L. This is called cap rates on group limits.

24 A Cool.

25 Q So did you share this document with the committee?

1 A Yes.

2 Q And are you familiar with it?

3 A I have read through this before, but I am not super familiar with it.

4 Q Okay. It looks -- would you take a minute just to look through it and see if
5 you can tell me what the differences between the new proposed -- the new or proposed
6 policy -- it's not exactly clear to me what's happening -- and the policy proposed to be
7 deprecated.

8 A So it says here IS, so IS is Integrity Science. So at Facebook, there's like
9 multiple kinds of data scientists. So there are data scientists that have the title data
10 scientists, and one might describe them more accurately as analysts. There are integrity
11 scientists who, like, I believe are basically the same thing, only they often work in like very
12 narrow scopes, and they have -- they're a little bit more full stack. So they often have
13 like a little bit more engineering skills or they can set up their own pipelines and stuff.
14 And then there are core data scientists, who are much more oriented towards machine
15 learning.

16 So what this is saying is that during, I'm guessing the election IPOC, given this is
17 from December 10th, I'm guessing that Integrity Science came in and said, we need to
18 reduce the number of -- we need to -- they probably put a cap on and said, hey, you can
19 only invite this number of friends a day to a group.

20 What this is saying, is, hey, like, this is a problem, because we are reducing the
21 chance of -- of viral new group growth by adding -- adding friends. So this is saying they
22 want to change that.

23 Adding target IDs when they have friended in less than 3 days. Group has
24 properties. High admin/sys ratio. United States user level. The rest is similar to the
25 previously launched policy. The new policy doesn't consider misinfo -- oh, interesting.

1 So they were moved -- so there's -- ACDC is like a database of flags. So, like, and
2 it's meant so you can begin to accumulate information on entities, be it a person, a group,
3 a piece of content. So this flag, misinfo 3PFC active for 90 days, means that that group
4 got a third-party fact-checking strike in the last 90 days.

5 It might mean more than a certain number of strikes. I just don't know. But it
6 means that these groups are actively distributing information that was said to be misinfo
7 by the third-party fact-checking. So the policy is, hey, don't let someone invite more
8 people if they're adding -- so a strategy that gets used is someone will go and friend a
9 whole bunch of people, and now that they have friended them, they can invite them to
10 their group.

11 So they're saying, don't allow them to invite it if they friended in less -- they
12 friended them less than 3 days ago. And the group has both properties -- the admin
13 switched -- the admins switched in the last week and -- and any admin posts the majority
14 of the content to the group on a 1-week basis.

15 That's a pretty low bar, by the way. So, like, you could have -- so what this is
16 looking for is groups where they're kind of like fake pages, right? So, like, a page, there's
17 like a single person or like a small group of people who can post content to that page and
18 it gets blasted out to people.

19 People create groups because there's less integrity work done on them but treat
20 them like pages. So they've invited all these people to this group, and then they use it
21 to blast out content to those groups. It's specifically applying to users in the United
22 States and the user has been adding 30 people per hour.

23 The difference between the previous policy launch and the new proposed one is
24 that we no longer look for group property.

25 Give me one -- I want to look something up real quick. Launch cap rate limits.

1 Launch cap rate -- launch cap rate limits.

2 Okay. Okay. So it says, the difference between the previous policy launch and
3 the new proposed one is that we no longer look for group property, third-party
4 fact-checking, or the misinfo thing. Eighty-five percent of the groups for which the users
5 would be rate limited by the new policy have -- oh, so they're basically saying it doesn't
6 matter. Either way, 85 percent of the groups that we're talking about here already have
7 that flag. So you're not adding --

8 Q Okay.

9 A -- that much by adding that flag.

10 Q Okay. Let's move to page 2.

11 A Sure, sure.

12 Q The last full sentence says -- that's not -- well, the last full sentence says,
13 since the election/protest-related groups have died down, most of the groups rate limited
14 are sales related or holiday parties with spam posts.

15 A Okay.

16 Q And this is on December 10th.

17 A Uh-huh. So I don't know the exact cadence of like when Stop the Steal
18 blew up. So I think it might be a thing of, like, the policy that they were using for those
19 rate limits. Like, let's imagine a scenario where the people that you're inviting are all
20 your real friends, right? You're inviting like all 3,000 of your real friends. Like, this
21 policy wouldn't apply to you, right? Because it's not new people that you've friended;
22 it's like your people you actually know.

23 Or, flip side, let's imagine you friended them all back in November, you've now
24 friended them more than 3 days ago, so the policy wouldn't apply to you.

25 So I don't -- I don't know -- I think they probably weren't thinking broadly enough

1 when they were looking at this policy.

2 Q Okay. Let's move on to document 18. We'll call that exhibit M. This is
3 the Sociographic Segments May Be Impactful for Both Hate Speech and Voter
4 Suppression.

5 A Yep.

6 Q So did you produce this to the committee?

7 A I did.

8 Q And you're familiar with it?

9 A Yes. I feel vindicated by this post because -- so I helped design and got
10 approval to build the segmentation system. And I said the reason why this is important
11 is you could use it for all these other harms. And so the fact that if it's impactful for hate
12 speech and voter suppression, that is exactly what I said was going to happen,
13 but -- what's your question?

14 Q Let's just start with describing a sociographic segment.

15 A Sure. So this came about because in October of 2019, they found a Russian
16 misinformation operation, an influence operation, that was sending targeted
17 misinformation to police officers, to environmental -- environmental activists, gay
18 activists, African-American activists. And they realized that narrow cast misinformation
19 was a problem.

20 The only challenge with detecting narrow cast misinformation and, like, why the
21 problem was not worked on for the, like -- they had known about this problem for like 4
22 years and no one had worked on it -- was, it's a delicate problem to work on because you
23 have to figure out how to divide up the population such that you can see structured
24 trends in how information is being distributed.

25 But at the same time, people might not agree with the labels that you're trying to

1 apply to them. And so the solution that we came up with was, instead of having explicit
2 labels on people, we would learn communities of people by looking at what groups and
3 pages people belonged to and interacted with, and we would make kind of like unnamed
4 groups. So we'd give them IDs, instead of saying, like, these are, you know, upper
5 middle-class White women who live in the Midwest, right?

6 And so as a result it's like more privacy sensitive -- it's more privacy sensitive.
7 The -- so what this doc is talking about is the idea that when you're trying to
8 understand -- so, like, the thesis that I had was that every integrity harm has an initiator
9 and a target. And the people who are the targets of hate speech are nonrandom and
10 the people who initiate hate speech are nonrandom.

11 And so what this is saying is, in the case of voter suppression, the same thing is
12 true, right? The majority of U.S. group posts containing voter suppression over the past
13 2 months are creating groups associated with just two sociographic segments. And I'm
14 guessing probably the same thing is true for hate speech.

15 Q Yeah. On page 2 --

16 A Uh-huh.

17 Q -- it says, harm is not equally distributed for hate speech and voter
18 interference. And there's a reference later, on page 3, to two of these groups. I
19 believe this might be under the voter interference. And so this document's what you
20 were -- what you were explaining?

21 A Uh-huh.

22 Q Okay. And so the two -- let's go down to the two segments most likely to
23 spread hate speech.

24 A Uh-huh.

25 Q So is it, just as hate speech or voter suppression might be targeted to certain

1 segments, are certain sociographic segments more valuable to Facebook in that they have
 2 more MSI, they spend more time on platform, they provide more revenue? Is that
 3 evenly distributed or is that --

4 A I would assume it's not, but I don't know that for sure. I know that there
 5 are traits that correlate with being exposed to misinformation, and some of those are
 6 things like viewing a lot of content. So I could imagine that some of these groups, if they
 7 appeal more to, say, people who are socially isolated, or marginalized in some way, those
 8 are also correlative factors for being exposed to a lot of misinformation.

9 I would guess -- the way I would probably -- there's a document -- hey, Libby, has
 10 the Jan. 6th folks gotten the -- there's a COVID -- actually, I know we haven't filed this SEC
 11 disclosure yet, so maybe this is why you guys haven't gotten it.

12 Ms. Liu. Oh, no, yeah, I have not gotten that.

13 Ms. Haugen. There's -- there's a really good paper on how for COVID
 14 misinformation, 80 percent of the COVID misinformation goes to 4 percent of the
 15 segments. Right?

16 Ms. Liu. Okay.

17 Ms. Haugen. And for the top -- for the top like -- and so we can make sure you
 18 get that doc, just so it gives an illustration of like this concentration --

19 Ms. Liu. Yes. I'll look for it and provide it to you guys.

20 Ms. Haugen. Okay.

21

22 Q Yeah. And if you look on page 7, it says, the prevalence of -- we can see
 23 that the lower bound CI -- I'm assuming that's confidence interval -- for prevalence of
 24 borderline content in the highest prevalence groups is 200 to 700 times the upper bound
 25 prevalence of borderline content in the segments experiencing the lowest frequency of

1 borderline hateful content.

2 A Yeah. That's amazing.

3 Q Is that a similar finding?

4 A Yeah, totally. Crazy. Not surprised.

5 Q And so Facebook knows about this?

6 A Yeah.

7 Q Could Facebook use that information to change how people experience the
8 platform who are in those segments?

9 A Unquestionably. Right? Like, they could go in there and say, like, why is it
10 these segments are -- are producing so much more hate speech.

11 One of the things that's talked about in the COVID doc is they talk about the
12 dynamics of the platform and how just from humans being social creatures, how
13 choices -- how the dynamics of being in these groups leads to concentrate the harms,
14 because people get normalized to these behaviors, right, where, like, if someone were to
15 step in and say, like, that's hate speech, like, that's not cool, like, they would get mocked
16 or kicked out of the group or bullied or that kind of thing.

17 And the same thing happens for like vaccine hesitancy content.

18 And so, yeah, like Facebook knows that this concentration effect is occurring.
19 And I am not aware of -- I'm not aware, but I also am not privy to everything of their plans
20 for addressing that specific phenomena.

21 Q So if a -- this might be a phenomena that happens outside of Facebook too,
22 but if a group or a group of people have rules or a set of norms that make it so that
23 expressing certain views makes it -- violates the rules or the norms, that can lead to what
24 kind of -- what kind of environments can that lead to?

25 A So I'll give you like a -- to give you a kind of concrete way of thinking about

1 the harm of the system. So let's imagine you had two groups. So one group was
2 healthy about dealing with -- dealing with hate speech, right, like, someone who posts
3 hate speech gets a warning the first time, gets kicked out of the group the second time.
4 Like, that group also likely is not as inflammatory, and so it is also likely viewed, based on
5 just pure engagement metrics, as being lower quality than a group that indulges in
6 inflammatory rhetoric, right, because inflammatory rhetoric elicits a reaction.

7 And so it's not just that, you know, when people are in environments where hate
8 speech is tolerated they begin to normalize that as a behavior, it's also a thing where
9 Facebook will actually give more reach and distribution to that group. Like, they will
10 recommend it a joinable group more often.

11 And I know that Facebook has some policies against what they consider
12 nonrecommendable groups, but, like, the thing that I was discussing earlier about, like,
13 the idea that Facebook knew that it's integrity systems took like 2 weeks to catch up, in a
14 world where you can invite like hundreds or thousands of people per day per person, and
15 you know you're not doing a great job of turning off these like, not actually independent
16 accounts, right, someone who has 10 separate accounts, you know, if it takes you 2
17 weeks to get identified as being like a bad group and not being recommended, it doesn't
18 really matter because you've already -- you've already been like promoted as a group to
19 join for a while. Right? So, yeah.

20 Q And then let's turn to page 4, last thing on this document, this exhibit. So
21 in the first paragraph under hate, it says segmentation -- this is the second full sentence.
22 I'll wait till we're there. Yes.

23 Segmentation is, at its core, a way to develop scaled, contextual understanding,
24 which should facilitate addressing core challenges such as understanding what slurs are
25 used in derogatory versus reclaimed ways, as well as identifying audiences which may be

1 experiencing hate speech disproportionately and whose platform experiences could be
2 improved with additional interventions.

3 A Yes.

4 Q So this is a powerful tool?

5 A Yes, yes. That is exactly the thesis. So I did not write this doc,
6 but -- because I was no longer in charge of this team by the time this doc had happened.
7 That is exactly why segmentation is so important, because, like, one of the key problems
8 on Facebook is that things like hate speech, you know, in minority communities, if
9 someone uses the term that is in the community, is different than when someone outside
10 the term uses that hate speech term.

11 And so when you begin to be able to have context to add scale, you can be both
12 more stringent in cracking down on communities that are actually engaged in hate
13 speech, and you can stop overenforcing on, say, minority communities.

14 But this could be true for any integrity harm, right? Like, you could imagine
15 using this context to be able to come in and say, like, given that this person is from a
16 group that generally generates hate speech, that gets directed at people who generally
17 receive it but don't generate it, like, that's a really powerful insight for changing your
18 priors when you're trying to decide whether or not you need to act.

19 So, yeah, like Facebook could do a lot -- a lot more with segmentation. I don't
20 think they are super interested in it because it would require them to admit they were
21 responsible. But it is a very powerful tool that they could do a lot with.

22 Q Okay. Do you have anything else on this document, or are we ready to
23 move?

24 A I haven't read through it closely enough recently enough to have --

25 Q Okay.

1 A -- big things for you.

2 Q Let's go to document 24. We'll call this exhibit N, N as in Nancy. This is
3 called Mission Control post Jan. 6 IPOC. So this is where I saw the term L3 IPOC. Did
4 you provide this document to the committee?

5 A I did.

6 Q And are you familiar with this document?

7 A I have not read through it closely, but I -- I don't think I'm very familiar with
8 this one. This is like a weekly notes document, so I'm not as aware [inaudible] from the
9 small ones.

10 Q And so what's Mission Control?

11 A So Mission Control, it may have been a thing where they changed the name
12 of like the team that was in charge of the IPOCs. I'm not sure.

13 Oh, actually, I wonder. So when they did the reorg, I wouldn't be surprised,
14 given that the name here is actually Mission Control, colon, response, I wouldn't be
15 surprised if there's like a Mission Control, colon, prediction, or something, or like Mission
16 Control: Alerting. Like, I wouldn't be surprised if there's different subteams under
17 Mission Control.

18 But this is Mission Control: Response, and that would make sense for it to have
19 the IPOC, which is like the war room under it.

20 Q And this is a -- this is a -- also it references the IPOC beginning on January
21 4th?

22 A Yep.

23 Q So crisis response levers, in the second bullet, it says, we have prepared
24 70-plus crisis response levers.

25 A Okay.

1 Q Do you know what that might be referring to? Do you think it's referring to
2 some of the break the glass measures we saw?

3 A Yeah. Yep.

4 Q Okay.

5 A They have a -- they have a database internally that lists all the available
6 measures and like tracks details on them, right? So things like, you know, where they're
7 being applied, when they were applied, all those things.

8 They should have like a library. It's like a specific application that tracks these
9 things. And so -- just so you guys are aware in case you want to subpoena that.

10 Q And it says, respond to multiple spikes in FRX VI, hate speech, voting, and
11 harassment, and misinformation.

12 How does Facebook know when there are spikes? Who's tracking that?

13 A Sure. So FRX is, I think, the system that takes in when people report
14 content. And so like if you go up to the upper right-hand corner of your post, and you
15 say, like, report this as hate speech, FRX, I think, is the system that tracks those reports.

16 And so this is saying, the FRX system got a bunch of spikes for V&I, which is
17 violence and incitement, hate speech, bullying and harassment, and misinformation.
18 They have dashboards that allow them to monitor these things, and I think they also have
19 automated alerting that tells you when there's like substantially higher levels than usual.

20 Q Let's go to page 2. Thank you.

21 This is a reference I was thinking about earlier that mentions the Georgia senate
22 runoff elections on January 5th, the Capitol insurrection on January 6th, and the U.S.
23 Presidential inauguration on January 20th.

24 Do you know -- we may have covered this -- do you remember -- do you know
25 who to start -- who decides when to start or launch an IPOC?

1 A So back when Civic Integrity existed, Samidh would have been the person to
2 decide. I don't know who would have been the person to decide post Samidh not being
3 in charge of Civic Integrity.

4 Q Okay. Let's go down to the last page on this document. It says, below is a
5 photo we feel perfectly captures our feelings on an unexpected 3 weeks in an L3 IPOC.
6 And it has a picture, I'm going to describe, of a slightly grumpy Bernie Sanders sitting at
7 the inauguration. It's a kind of famous meme photo. So it says an unexpected 3 weeks
8 in an L3 IPOC.

9 A Uh-huh.

10 Q What does the "unexpected" tell you?

11 A That they started at the last moment, right? Like, that this wasn't a thing
12 that is anticipated or that, you know, there wasn't someone monitoring the situation for
13 the second half of December and like alerting people and bringing people back early.

14 Q Okay. I don't think I have anything else on this. Let's move to document
15 31, which we will now call exhibit --

16 A And, actually, I want to flag something just for you guys for context.

17 Q Yeah.

18 A So I worked at -- I worked at Google in addition to working at Facebook, and,
19 you know -- you know, Facebooks might come back and say, like, oh, tech companies,
20 like, everyone's out for vacation, like, no one's watching the store, like, this is normal
21 practice.

22 When I worked on the Google Books class action lawsuit, so this was like the
23 largest class action lawsuit in, I think, U.S. history, like -- because Google scanned a lot of
24 books without asking permission first.

25 And we launched our rights claiming center on like the 3rd of January, because

1 that's when the plaintiffs wanted to launch it, and they didn't want to wait, and it didn't
2 matter that like tech people take a lot of vacation over the holidays or whatever. Like,
3 we came in over the period from between Christmas and New Year's and, like, we
4 shipped that thing on the 3rd of January. Like, it didn't matter.

5 And so, like, don't let them use as an excuse that it was the holidays, because they
6 could have -- they could have done something. It was a thing that could have been
7 done.

8 Q Wasn't there a lockdown at the end of 2019?

9 A There was a lockdown for all of Q4 of 2019.

10 Q Did that extend into the holidays or no?

11 A I don't think so. I think that ended -- I think that would have ended around
12 the 17th -- like, there was probably some people doing like last touches, but I think it
13 pro- -- that probably would have wrapped up before Christmas.

14 Q Okay. That's fine. Let's move on.

15 So this is document 31, as I said, it's exhibit O. It's called copy -- it's called civics
16 forensics.

17 A Uh-huh.

18 Q So this really starts on page 2 and 3. Are you familiar with this -- or did you
19 provide this document to the committee?

20 A Yes.

21 Q And are you familiar with this document?

22 A You know, I don't know if I am. Give me just 1 second. Forensics. I
23 really -- I love these chats because I do learn stuff from you guys all the time. Give me 1
24 second. Civic forensics. Yeah, I don't think I'm familiar with this. This is a new one to
25 me.

1 Q Well, let's go through it.

2 A I haven't read all of them super quick. Yeah.

3 Q So -- I'm sorry?

4 A I said have at it. I wish to learn.

5 Q Oh, my audio might be messed up. Can everyone hear me?

6 A Yeah, I can hear you.

7 Q Okay. Good. So it says in the summary, about half of top civic groups
8 have been related to D14N.

9 A Uh-huh.

10 Q Do you know if that's delegitimization?

11 A If it has -- if delegitimization has 16 letters in it, then that would be
12 delegitimization -- delegitimization.

13 Q Okay.

14 A The convention in tech circles is that when you have really long words,
15 instead of spelling them, you, like, do the first letter and the last letter and then how
16 many letters are in between.

17 Q Okay. We'll count.

18 A So like a classic one is localization, is called L10N, right, because there's 10
19 letters in between for localization.

20 Q Okay. Great. So Facebook has said that they took down this -- they
21 publicly said that they took down the Stop the Steal group 2 days after the election. I
22 believe it was on November 5th. But let's take a look at page 4.

23 A Yeah.

24 Q It appears that there are still groups with the words "Stop the Steal"
25 operating, and I believe this document is created on or after November 12th --

1 A Uh-huh.

2 Q -- based on the title and the fact that --

3 A Yeah.

4 Q -- there's four different dates up there with statistics next to them. So
5 what are these groups still doing here in this table?

6 A I don't know. I would guess that they didn't have enough people staffed on
7 it and -- or like Facebook just hadn't taken it down on that date.

8 Q Okay. So -- and the date that we're looking at for this document is
9 November 12th.

10 A Uh-huh.

11 Q So let's go to page 6 now. It says, how top civic groups -- I'm sorry -- how
12 top civic group posts are ranked and feed is very different from how overall group posts
13 are ranked and feed.

14 Do you know why that is?

15 A That's a great question. Position difference.

16 Okay. So what this is saying is that the factors that are driving that ranking
17 are -- zooming in -- so we have group MSI V2, which, you know, could be just normal MSI,
18 but with like a -- within groups.

19 Clean linear VPVD, not sure, photo click, BVI score.

20 So looks like it's overwhelmingly driven by -- oh, actually -- oh, that's interesting.
21 Okay. Yeah, let's walk through this.

22 So the title on the slide, as you just said, is how top civic group posts are ranked
23 and feed is very different from how overall group posts are ranked and feed.

24 And the top factor here is group MSI.

25 And the second one, I'm not sure what clean linear VPVD is. It might be

1 something around, just like how many impressions they've gotten.

2 And the third one is photo clicks.

3 And -- and so what this seems to me is, given the outsize impact of group MSI,
4 like, these are posts that elicit strong reactions. They might get lots and lots of
5 comments. They might get lots of reactions. They might get lots of reshares. But as
6 a result, the MSI component of the score is much, much, much higher.

7 And there are lots of things here where like, you know, there are -- you can see
8 here that there are other things that could be used in the score, but overwhelmingly it's
9 being dominated by MSI, which means ability to elicit reactions.

10 Q Okay. I don't think we have anything else for this document. Let's run
11 through some cleanup from last time, and if we have time, we'll turn to another
12 document.

13 A Okay.

14 Q So did Facebook pay any special attention to important accounts, like the
15 account of President Trump or other major figures, or things relevant to January 6th?

16 A I am not aware of specific actions with regard to January 6th. I know that,
17 in general, there is a program called Cross-Check which gives basically a free pass to
18 highly influential accounts.

19 Because the thing that's really important for people to understand is that content
20 gets most of its distribution in the first day or two. And one of the things that we saw
21 across the documents around Cross-Check was that overwhelmingly they were having a
22 multiday SLA, like, it would take them multiple days to check that content.

23 And so you effectively, you know, justice delayed is justice denied in this case.

24 So if -- if you had prominent accounts that were goading on the Capitol rioters,
25 then they would likely have not been held to the same standards as the average people

1 on the site.

2 Q Okay. Thank you.

3 Specifically about President Trump, you're not aware of anything additional, aside
4 from a --

5 A Yeah.

6 Q -- cross-check?

7 Okay. You mentioned that people promoted to run Civic Integrity were folks
8 who were successful on the growth team.

9 A Uh-huh.

10 Q Maybe they had an instinct or inclination for growth. Do you have -- are
11 there particular people who you had in mind when you said that?

12 A I'm thinking of, The Wall Street Journal did an analysis on employees at
13 Facebook, where they looked at who was promoted and from where, and I believe that
14 analysis is referred to publicly.

15 Q Okay.

16 A I think Guy Rosen came from growth, like, the head of Civic Integ- -- not Civic
17 Integrity -- the head of integrity. Like, he originally had a VPN company that did
18 basically spyware, and then I believe he was in growth, and then ended up in charge of
19 integrity. But you'd have to double-check that. I don't have his, like, CV memorized.

20 Q Okay. Let's go back -- I don't know if we need to go there, but when we
21 were talking last time, we spent a lot of time on exhibit A with the Capitol Protest break
22 the glass tables.

23 A Uh-huh.

24 Q And you mentioned that the notes reflect a 1 p.m. meeting?

25 A Uh-huh.

1 Q Are you familiar -- so what meeting were you talking about, and do you
2 know who attended it?

3 A I don't know who attended it. All I know is that it says, like, notes from
4 1 p.m. meeting, so I assume there was a 1 p.m. meeting. And given, for some of them,
5 there are like specific, like, next steps, I'm assuming that was from 1 p.m. that day.

6 Q Okay. And then lastly for exhibit C, you mentioned that there was a ticket
7 that -- or we talked about -- there was a ticket where about 7,000 users were suspended.
8 Is that a large number of accounts to suspend based on a ticket?

9 A Not necessarily.

10 Q Okay.

11 A Like, it depends on like what -- what does your team do. And often when
12 there are new safety systems implanted, your first takedown might be quite large. So
13 you might take down, you know, tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of accounts
14 simultaneously.

15 Q So I think you answered this a little earlier today, but last time, you said a
16 failure to implement the soft action feedbacks that were presented to Mark Zuckerberg in
17 exhibit D, which we can go to document exhibit D if you want to look at them, but you
18 said a failure to implement these meant that people who never followed the Stop the
19 Steal content would have gotten invited to it or shown it.

20 Can you -- did we talk about that earlier today? Were you discussing something
21 else? What --

22 A So I don't know. We can look at document D again. I'm not sure
23 which -- which exact document is document D.

24 Q MZ feedback. We have it up on our screen, if you want.

25 A Okay.

1 Q It's exhibit D.

2 A I know that we talked about things out of there around like MSI. I don't
3 know if any of the soft actions in that document would have stopped auto-inserting
4 content into people's feeds.

5 My understanding, that was just like a characteristic of the group's product and
6 not something that was considered for removal by soft actions. But if that is one of
7 them, that's a great one.

8 Yeah, so the one we talked about before was downstream model
9 depreciation -- or not depreciation -- deprecation. And that's the one that says like, you
10 know, should we overreward things that are engaged with one hop down. So like if I
11 reshare something and one of my friends likes it, should we reward that content.

12 Q Okay. Great. Let's move back to the documents which -- sorry -- or
13 continuing with document 12, which we'll mark as P, exhibit P, document 12, political
14 influence on content policy.

15 A Ooh, yeah.

16 Q So did you share this document with the committee?

17 A Yes.

18 Q And are you familiar with this?

19 A Yes.

20 Q All right. Is this a badge note?

21 A No, I don't think it's a badge note.

22 Q Okay.

23 A I think it's just like someone reflecting on political influence.

24 Q This was written in December 2020, and --

25 A Yes. Yep, yep.

1 Q And it says on page 2 that the influence of public policy is a -- the influence
2 of the public policy -- this is number 3. The influence of a public policy team is a
3 common topic of complaint inside the integrity org.

4 Is that your experience of the integrity org?

5 A Yeah, I would agree with that.

6 Q Okay.

7 A In my personal experience.

8 Q All right. I'm -- okay. Let's move on to page 3, where it says at the top,
9 misinformation repeat offender escalations seem to have regularly been influenced by
10 input from public policy, exempting publishers on the grounds that they are sensitive or
11 likely to retaliate. In the U.S., it appears that interventions have been almost exclusively
12 on behalf of conservative publishers.

13 A I would be unsurprised by that.

14 Q Okay. But you don't -- do you recall any specific influences where this was
15 the case?

16 A I know that there are certain, like, you can go through and look at -- there's
17 certain actions, like the sparing sharing rollback, where -- so the sparing sharing was this
18 thing that said, given that a disproportionate fraction of all the misinformation is shared
19 by people who are hypersharers -- so they're people who go and share, you know,
20 hundreds of times a day -- we should demote content that comes from hypersharers.

21 And if you go and read like the political impacts report on that one, there is a
22 larger impact on conservatives than -- or on conservative sources than liberal sources.
23 And, like, there was a lot of dance around things like defensibility, where, like, the reason
24 why sparing sharing was rolled back officially was that it was, quote, not defensible.
25 Because there was nothing intrinsically wrong, like, you couldn't prove that any given

1 hypersharer was actually a bad hypersharer.

2 And -- but, like, I think the real motivation for that policy was that conservative
3 outlets were hurt more by it, and therefore it was considered, quote, not defensible.

4 But I don't know. Like, I wasn't in those discussions, so I can't like speak broadly
5 across it. All I know is there's multiple documents that talk about the idea of, like, of
6 rollbacks of things that were accepted as like important tools for keeping people safer on
7 Facebook --

8 Q Okay.

9 A -- because of like -- because conservatives were harmed more.

10 Q Okay. Further on this page, the next bullet, it says, we have made one-off
11 carve-outs and misinformation enforcement apparently due to political pressure.

12 Is this --

13 A I would be -- I would be unsurprised. I did not personally experience that,
14 but I would be unsurprised if that was true.

15 Q Yeah. I guess, just let me know if -- if you have anything to add to these.
16 And then further on this page, after the bold in 4, it says -- second full sentence -- in
17 multiple cases, the final judgment about whether a prominent post violates a certain
18 written policy are made by senior executives, sometimes Mark Zuckerberg.

19 A I would be unsurprised by that. But I've seen that in multiple other
20 documents where it's alluded to, that things have gone -- like, for -- for -- Cross-Check has
21 this all the time, where something would be seen as violating and it might get delayed
22 even longer, even after it's seen by a person because it needs to get escalated all the way
23 up to executives.

24 Q And then lastly, further up, it says, public policy usually reviewed algorithm
25 changes and that they, quote, typically are interested in the impact on politicians and

1 political media, and they commonly veto launches which have significant negative
2 impacts on politically sensitive actors.

3 A Yeah. Not surprised.

4 Q All right. Let's go to page 10, where --

5 A Do you want to -- do you want to know who wrote this? Is that useful to
6 you guys?

7 Q Yes.

8 A Because I'm happy to unblind this one. So Tom Cunningham is a very, very
9 good data scientist, and I believe he worked at Facebook for at least -- at least like maybe
10 4 years, maybe longer. Yeah. So Tom Cunningham, last name, C-u-n-n-i-n-g-h-a-m.
11 And he's excellent. He wrote lots and lots of wonderful documents.

12 Q Okay. So let's turn to page 10. It says Trump Hate Speech. There have
13 been a number of cases where senior executives made the final call about whether a post
14 by the U.S. President violated certain rules. Whether or not the post violated the rules
15 is unclear to me why executives should be making this decision, rather than content
16 policy experts, unless it's due to political considerations.

17 So was this widely understood in Facebook that Mark Zuckerberg or other senior
18 executives were making the final call?

19 A I wouldn't say it was widely known, because I think most people who don't
20 work on integrity don't ever think about any of these things. Right? So I think among
21 people who were actively working in these problem spaces, it was probably known, but I
22 would not say it was widely known across the company.

23 Q Okay. So on page 12, it talks about repeat offenders and specifically how
24 they were overturned after escalation -- the designation was overturned after escalation
25 by public policy, including Breitbart, Charlie Kirk, Diamond and Silk and PragerU. Do you

1 remember any of that occurring?

2 A I did not work on that, so I'm not aware.

3 Q Okay. And then up to page 9. Let me find the text. Hold on.

4 So it sounds like you would not be surprised to learn that as of November and
5 December, because, again, this post from Tom Cunningham was on December 11th, you
6 would not be surprised to learn that in these ways and maybe others Facebook was
7 systematically declining to enforce its content policies against --

8 A Yeah, yeah. I would not be surprised.

9 Q -- against whom? Okay. Against whom?

10 A Against people who had political power and particularly, like, because the
11 right complains so much more loudly about Facebook than the left, there is substantially
12 more sensitivity towards keeping them happy regardless of what the actual, like, factual
13 reality is. Like, there's a perception on the right that Conservatives are being singled
14 out, and because they have made that so -- so visibly known, I think the company is afraid
15 of angering them.

16 [REDACTED] Okay. It's now after 4, so I'm going to read the concluding
17 text.

18 It's been a long day. I appreciate you being with us and taking the time to
19 answer our questions. Some last minute business. If something occurs to you later,
20 please reach out to the select committee to correct the record.

21 If your counsel has any questions they want to -- or statements they want to make
22 to clarify anything on the record, we have time for that now. We can speak off the
23 record afterwards.

24 Counsel?

25 Mr. Bakaj. Nothing to add at this time. Thank you, sir.

1 [REDACTED] Okay. You will have an opportunity to review the transcript.

2 And if no one else has anything for the record, before we recess this deposition, I
3 will say, we are now recessed, subject to the call of the chair, and we will go off the
4 record.

5 [Whereupon, at 4:03 p.m., the interview was recessed, subject to the call of the
6 chair.]

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Certificate of Deponent/Interviewee

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I have read the foregoing ____ pages, which contain the correct transcript of the
answers made by me to the questions therein recorded.

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Witness Name

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